Enjoy the confusion. Thanks, StreetEasy and brokers.

265 East Houston Street

January 18, 2026

Last time, we introduced the boutique condo at 265 East Houston Street. Today, we’re going to review its transaction history.

If that sounds dull, then Enjoy the Silence…my new favorite mash-up. (If you like Depeche Mode or Brittany Spears, you will like this jam from Dead On A Sunday. If you don’t, there’s still the transaction history to enjoy.)

Ready? (Say, “Hit me, baby, one more time.”)

Before I hit you with numbers, I must mention: One of the defining quirks of this building is that it has been marketed inconsistently over time. As the property moved from sponsor sales to resales, and from one brokerage to another, unit naming conventions changed.

As a result, the same physical apartment appears under different labels depending on when and how it was marketed. Apartment 3A and Apartment 3, for example, are the same unit. The same is true for other “A” suffixes that appear early in the building’s history and later disappear.

If you are a buyer casually browsing listings and trying to understand a unit’s transaction history, this creates a serious problem. What you are often seeing is not the full history of the apartment itself, but only the history of that apartment as most recently labeled and marketed. In other words, you may be looking at a partial record without realizing it.

(I know.) All I ever wanted. All I ever needed was here in [front of] my [eyes]. Words are very unnecessary. They can only do harm.

Can you rely on what you see on StreetEasy? Yes and no.

Yes, because it is the primary gatekeeper of residential transaction data in New York City and the default research tool for buyers.

No, because when unit histories are fragmented by inconsistent labeling, that fragmentation is effectively preserved and amplified.

At the same time, brokerages bear responsibility as well. They often have access to prior marketing history — or at least the know-how to decode and unpack — but do not consistently reconcile or help to restore continuity for the public record.

Some of this is structural. Some of it is human error. Some of it is fatigue. Some of it is vile and vindictive. Nobody is entirely at fault, and nobody is entirely innocent. The net result, though, is that buyers are left with an incomplete picture unless they take the time to reconstruct it themselves. (Or, unless they read More For LES!)

In the words of Maui: You’re welcome!

By collapsing duplicate unit labels and treating each physical apartment as a single asset, this is how the transaction history of the units in this building actually appears to have unfolded.

[Please note: I have not included links to each unit since there are multiple links, e.g., 3 and 3A. This is why I’ve also cheated you out of pictures in this transmission. I’m sorry. I know that “words are meaningless and forgettable.” Forgive me, and visit the building site for details.]

Unit #3
Unit 3 was first listed by the sponsor in October 2017 at $2.1M, quickly reduced to $1.995M, and sold in May 2018 at that price. It resold in January 2019 for the same $1.995M, showing no early appreciation. In June 2024, the unit returned to market at $2.75M, was briefly increased to $2.85M, then reduced multiple times before being delisted in September 2024 at $2.499M without a sale.

Despite multiple market cycles, Unit 3 has produced no realized appreciation to date and failed to convert a materially higher 2024 valuation into a completed sale.

Unit #4
Unit 4 was listed by the sponsor in early 2018 at $2.15M and sold in October 2018 for $1.925M, a verified closing approximately 10.5% below the original asking price. No subsequent resale has been recorded.

With only one recorded transaction at a sponsor discount and no resale data, Unit 4’s long-term performance remains indeterminate.

Unit #5
Unit 5 was originally listed by the sponsor in May 2017 at $2.46M and reportedly sold later that year at the same price, though the sale is unverified. The unit reappeared on the market in 2019 at $1.995M and sold in August 2019 for $1.934M. It sold again in March 2023 for $2.15M, representing one of the clearer examples of realized appreciation in the building.

Unit 5 stands out as one of the few units to achieve meaningful realized appreciation, recovering from a 2019 low to post a double-digit gain by 2023.

Unit #6
Unit 6 was listed in March 2018 at $2.15M and sold shortly thereafter at the asking price. It returned to market in February 2019 at $2.195M, went into contract later that year, and closed in January 2020 for $1.995M, reflecting a modest resale discount.

Unit 6 experienced modest value erosion on resale, exiting its sponsor price range with a mid-single-digit percentage loss.

Unit #7
Unit 7 entered the resale market in April 2019 at $2.395M and sold in October 2019 at that price. It was relisted in February 2021 at $2.0M, reduced to $1.925M, went into contract at $1.895M, and reportedly sold in August 2022 at that level, marking a significant decline from its prior sale.

Unit 7 represents the weakest realized performance in the building, recording a resale roughly one-fifth below its prior closing price.

Unit #8
Unit 8 was listed by the sponsor in October 2018 at $2.495M and sold quickly in November 2018 for $2.3M, a verified closing roughly 7.8% below the asking price. No resale has been recorded since.

With no resale history, Unit 8 offers no evidence of post-sponsor price growth beyond its initial discounted closing.

Penthouse (PH)
The penthouse sold as a sponsor unit in October 2018 for $3.1M. It was relisted in August 2020 at $3.295M and underwent several price reductions before going into contract at $2.85M and selling in April 2021 at that price, below its original sponsor closing despite favorable market conditions.

Even at the top of the stack, the penthouse failed to hold its sponsor valuation, reselling at a single-digit percentage loss during a favorable market period.

To summarize: In nominal terms, most units in the building have struggled to exceed or even match their original sponsor pricing, with only isolated instances of modest gains, while in real (inflation-adjusted) terms the building has broadly delivered flat to negative returns, indicating a clear loss of purchasing power for nearly all owners over the period examined.

To close this series out, we’ll look back at the question we asked on Day 1. Because:

I must confess that…I still believe…that you will be here.